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[L. A. No. 21405. In Bank. Dee. 27, 1950.]

OTTIE GILLESPIE et al., Respondents, v. OITY OF LOS
ANGELES, Appellant. !",
[1) Streets-Injuries Oausecl by Defects-Public LlabD!tJ Act.A eity without authority to remedy a dangerous condition of
a state highway at the place where an accident OCCUl'S is not
liable under the Public Liability Act (Gov. Code, 163051) for
failure to do 80.
[i] Id.-InjurIes Oaused by Defects-LfabWtJ of KUDicipalitJ.A city is not liable under Sts. & Hy. Code, I§ 2'1, 100, 204,
for daugerous and defective conditions of state highways.
[8] Highway&-KaiDtenance.-All state highways including those
within cities are under the state's jurisdiction at the term kl
used in Veh. Code, 1465, relating to official tramc control
devices, and are not in the respective jurisdietions of cities
through which they pass i merefore such cities han no power
under this section to post warnings of dangerous conditions on ,
.
such highways.
[f] Id.-Maintenanee.-Vch. Code, § 465, authorizing .tate and
,local agencies to install traffic signs in their respective juris._ .. ' ....".di~ij~~_~.d~.~~_~_:t:ll~.~~, .1127,100,204, relating to control andllD&intenaneeot etate highways by the Department
of Public Works, are .. fH.Iri ..atef'itJ and must be construed
-together.·..
'
(6] Streets-lDjuries Oaused by Defects-Defects on State JlighW&ys.-Under a contract deiegating from tbe state to a city
the maintenance of areas !letween curb Jines and rigbtoOf-way
lines of sections of state highways within the city, the city
is neither authorized nor placed under a duty to correct •
dangerous condition on such a highway by erecting barricades
or warning signs between such lines, where thc highway is •
mountain road without tbe usual curbs and sidewalks, the
section in the city is less than one mile of. 20-mile highway,
and the parties had interpreted the contract as imposing no
duty of maintenance of such highway on the city.
[6] Id.-Injuries from Defects-Defects on State Highw&,..-A.
eity's contract with the state neither authorizes nor places
the city under a duty to erect signs warning of a dangerous
conditiolA on a state highway partly within its limits, where
[1] See 19 Oal.Jur. 126.
. [3] See 13 Oat.Jur. 338; 25 Am.Jor. 372.
licK. Dig. References: [1,2] Streets, t
173; [5,6] Streets, 178(1) •.

)

n;

[3,4] Highways,

554 f

GILLESPIE V. CITY OF LOR ANGELES

its contractual dutil'S are limited to keeping the
ttructures and facilities in the safe and usable eondition
which they have been improved, and failure to do 80 is
shown.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Angeles County. Clarence L. Kincaid, Judge. Re·ver.ecJ~~
Actions against city for damages for wrongful deaths
ing out of all automobile accident alleged to have been
by dangerous or defective condition of a highway. JUQigment.t4
for plaintiffs reversed.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Bourke Jones,
City Attorney, Victor P. Spero, James A. Doherty and
ard G. Husar, Deputy City Attorneys, for Appellant.
C. R. Montgomery and Robert E. Reed as Amici Curiae
Appellant.
Ben C. Cohen, Leo Shapiro and S. S. Hahn for

J.tesp()n!llen·f3'c~j

TRA YNOR, J .-Route 156 is a state highway
from Chatsworth to Topanga Beach in Los Angeles '"Joun·[V.··."l
"---Prom--Ventura Boulevard in the city of Sherman Oaks .
to the Pacific Ocean for about 20 miles through Topanga
-Canyon,the highway, -commonly known as Topanga
Road, is a twisting paved mountain road varying in width
from 20 to 24 feet, with 6 to 8-foot shoulders of rock and oil _.
or decomposed granite. About .86 of a mile of Topanga Canyon Road lies within the corporate limits of the city of Los
Angeles.
On the morning of September 5, 1943, the burned wreckage
of a 1933 Hupmobile sedan owned by plaintiff Ottie Gillespie
was discovered at the bottom of Topanga Canyon below the
part of the highway within the Los Angeles city limits, about
3.2 miles northeast of the junction of Topanga Canyon Road
and the Roosevelt Highway at Topanga Beach. In the wreckage were the charred bodies of six people, from 19 to 24 years
of age. There were no survivors of the accident and no eyewitnesses thereto.
Plaintiffs, surviving relatives of the victims of the accident,
brought this action for wrongful death in the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, joininJr as defendants the city of Los
Anl!pJ·s And the Statf' of ("RJifornia. The ('omplaint alleged
that thtl accident was caw;tltl 1.Iy tlefendant.ll' negligence in the
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design, cOnstruction, and maintenance of the highway, in that
usaid highway is so laid out and constructed as to make it
appear that the same is straight and continuous at said point
[at which the automobile presumably left the road] when in
far.t the same prescribes a horseshoe turn or curve, swinging
sharply inward and returning to a line approximately even
with the line of said highway immediately prior to said
.abrupt turn • • . the distance from said highway at said
point to the bottom of said embankment being more than
150 feet • . . that there were and are no lights, blinkers, or
warning signals of any kind or character at the approach to
said curve to indicate or disclose the existence thereof . . •
that there were and are no fences, guard rails, barriers, barricades or embankments or other safety devices around said
curve or the approach thereto to apprise persons of the fact
that the said highway curves at said point and does not continue in a straight direction . . . that at said time and place
and as a direct and proximate result of the said dangerous
and defective condition as aforesaid, the said automobile • . .
went off the highway and fell to the bottom of the embankment, at said point a distance of more than 150 feet." It is
plaintiffs' theory that by reason of the alleged negligence of
the citY, and the state ,in failing to warn approaching drivers
of the existence of the curve, the driver of the automobile,
while exercising due care for his own safety and that of his
passengers, drove straight ahead on the road, not knowing
that it cuned sharplY'inward, and plunged off the road to the
bottom of the canyon. On the state's motion,a change of
venue to Sacramento County was granted. The trial court
there sustained the state's objection to the introduction of
any testimony and the action was dismissed against the state
on the ground that the suit was one against it in its sovereign
capacity to which it had not consented Plaintiffs' motion
for retransfer to Los Angeles County for convenience of
witnesses was granted. The cause proceeded to trial before
a jury against the city, and the jury returned verdicts for
plaintiffs aggregating $110,000. The city appeals from the
judgments entered thereon.
The city's principal contention is that it was not legally
responsible for the condition of the state highway where the
accident occurred because it had no control over, or authority
with respect to, the maintenance of the highway. Plaintiffs
contend, however, that under the provisions of the Public
Liability Act of 1923 (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619, now

~
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Gov. Code, § 53051) the city'is liable for dangerous or
fective conditions in a highway whether or not it has
over it, and that in any event it had enough control over
highway in question to remedy the condition had it so w ..mM'[I~"'"
The Public Liability Act of 1923 provides:
"Counties, municipalities and school districts shalJ be
for injuries to persons and property resulting from
dangerous or defective condition of public streets, hi"'h ..... ..,..
buildings, grounds, works and property in all cases when_
the governtng or managing board of B'Uch C01uaty, municipalt.!I" ,
school district, or other board, officer or person havingn-'
thoNty to remedy such condition, had knowledge or noticeof~
the defective or dangerous condition , . . and failed or neg· ;
lected, for a reasonable time after acquiring such knowk
edge or receiving such notice, to remedy such condition or'
failed and neglected for a reasonable time after acquiring sUch
knowledge or receiving such notice to take such action as maybe reasonably necessary to protect the public against stich.....;
dangerous or defective condition." (Italics added.)
.:.J
Although it is clear from the wording of the statute that :1
a city cannot be liable for a dangerous or defective conditio~.~
of a public street or bighway unless it bas authority to remedy 3
the condition, plaintiffs contend that the cases' of -Shea, • :
City of San Bernardino, 7 Ca1.2d 688 [62 P.2d 365], BOBt;tti(~
v. City of San Bernardino, 2 Ca1.2d 747 [43 P.2d 547],•
Rose v. County of Orange, 94 Cal.App.2d 688 [211 P.2d 45k~:
establish the rule that even if a municipality is witbout power
to correct a dangerous or defective condition, it is under a
duty to warn of its existence or request those with the
necessary authority to remedy it. We cannot agree with this
contention.
.
In the Bosqui case a viaduct that was part of the system
of city streets was allowed to fall into disrepair. The city
contended that under an order of the railroad commission, j
the utility operating the railroad over which the viaduct passed .1
had the sole duty of repair. Far from holding that the citY's;
authority to remedy the condition was not a necessary prerequisite to liability under the Public Liability Act, the
court took care to note that the order of the commission did
not deprive the city of control over the viaduct or rclieveJtJ
of its duty to remedy the condition.
.
In the Shea case a city street crossed a railroad track. The
city contended that the dangerous condition was caused by
the elevation of the rails, over which the railroad commission
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had exclusive jurisdiction. The court held that the city was
under a duty to request the commission to correct the condition
or to warn the public of the danger.
. In the &se case a county road ran at right angles into a
state highway and terminated. There was a dangeroull ditch
at the side of the state highway opposite the end of the
county road. The court held that eVE'n though the county bft.d
. no power to correct the dangerous (>ondition bordering thl'
state highway, it was under a duty to warn persons on the
eounty road of the danger lying at its end.
.: Both the Shea and the Rose eases are thus examples of
situations where streets over which the city or county bad
control were made dangerous by conditions that the 10eaJ
governments could not control. In both eases, however, the
city or county had authority at least to warn of the dangers.
They had eontrol over their own highways and authority
therefore to post warnings along those highways of the dangel'tl
created by conditions contiguous thereto.
.
In the present case, however, the condition of the bighwa~"
did not make a city street dangerous. The danger Jay whon~·
on th~ state highway itself. [1] If the city had no authority
---,.;...tQ re~~9y_~e condition of the state highway when· th.· at·{·j.
dent occurred ffCannot ~1iable under the terms of the Puttl ...
.
Liability Act for failure to do 80.
.
". .. Section 100 of the Streets and Highways Code,in effl'c1 III
1943 at the time the accident happened, provided:
"The [state] department [of public worksJ shall have full
possession and control of all State high ways. . . . The d,,·
partment shall maintain any existing tl'aversabll' highway
which is between the termini of, and approximately on, any .
route included in the State highway system. • • ."
Section 27 of the same code provides in part:
"As used in the general provisions and in Divisions I and II
of code, 'maintenance' includes:
"<a> The preservation and keeping of rights of way, and
each type of roadway. structure, and facility, in the safe and
usable condition to which it bas been improvecl or con·
atructeJ. . . .
"(b) The neces.<;ary provisiun for spevial safety con\oenienccs and devices. . . .
"Thc degrce and type of maintcMftCe for each highwny,
or portion thereof, shall be determined in the discretion of
the authorities charged with the maintenance thereof, taking
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into consideration traffic requirements and moneys available:
therl'for."
.
.
Scction 204 provideR:
"The department shall ('xcrcise the same powers and duties"
with respect to State highways within cities as with respt'Ct··
to other State highways."
'
Under these provisions the statc department of public worb,.
not the city, hItS authority to rflmedy dangerous or defective·
conditions on stnte highways within the city limits. "1'he
dcgrpc and type of maintl'nance" including "safety con--.
veniences and dc,"'ices" are to be oetermincd by the statE'
al~cncy. [2] It follows that the city is not liable for dangerous
or defective conditions of state highways under these provisions.
[3] It is contended, however, that the city has power
under section 465 of the Vehicle Code to post warnings of
dangerous conditions existing on state high ways. That section -':
provides:
.,
"(a) The State Department of Public Works, Division
of Highways, shall place and maintain. or cause to be plaeed
twd maintained, with respect to highways under its jurisdic- .
tion, appropriat.e signs and signals as required hereundc
and may respectively place and maintain, or cause to be
placed aIlu maintained, such appropriate signs and signals
1\." lIlay be authorized hereunder, Ilr as' may be necessary;!
properly to inuicate and to carry out the provisions of this -:'
code, or to direct or warn traffic upon the highways.
" (b) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions shall
place and maintain or canse to be placed and maintained
snch traffic signs anrt, subject to the provisions of Section 466,
such stop signs, semnphores and control devices upon streets .1
alld highways as may be necessary to indicate and to cnrry il
out the pro,"il>ions of this coue or local traffic ordinances or to 11
r<'gulate, warn or guide traffic."
,
Under these proviRions the State Department of Public j
Works has the duty to post traffic signs and signals on hi~h-l
ways "unuer its jurisdiction"; local authorities "in their
respective jurisdictions" have the duty to post such signs
and signals on streets and highways. [4] Section 405 of thl'
Vchicle Code and the foregoing sections of the Streets anrl
Highways Code are in pari materia and must be construed
together. (Ebert v. State of California, 33 Ca1.2d 502, 50!)
(202 P.2d 10221 : People v. Trieber, 28 Ca1.2d 657, 661 [171
P.2d 1] ; In re Porterfield, 28 Ca1.2d 91, 100 [168 P.2d 706,
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167 A.L.R. 675] ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Rm7.rond Com., 13 Cal.
2d 89, 100 [87 P.2d 1055).) [3b] The Statc Dl'partment of
Public Works has "full posst'ssionand control" of all state
hi~hways (Sts. & Hy. Codt'o § 100) including "State highways
within cities. " (Sts. & By. Code, § 204.) Such highways arc
thc>refore "under its jurisdiction" within the meaning of scction 465 of the Vehicle Code. The duty to place and maintain
tht' traffic signs and signals required by that section is expressly
placed on tIle State Department of Public Works. Moreover,
it is that department only that determines the dt'~ree and tYPtl
of maintenance including "safety conveniences and dcvicps"
for ('ncb state highway. (Sts. & By. Code. §§ 27, 100.) It
fo)]ows that state highways art' not within tht' jurisdiction of
)oca] al1thorities to control or maintain. and art' therefore not
"in tbeir respective jurisciic>tions" under section 465 of the
Vt'hicle Code.
To hold that a state hi~hway. which. the State Dt'partment
of Public Works has "fun posst'ssion and control of." and for
which that dcpartment rll'tf'rmines the degree and type of
maintenance. including snfety conveniences and devices. is
"in [the] respectivt' jurisctiC'tions"of local authorities would
not only. create.a direct .conflict between. tb~.. t~~.codes. but
would lead to anomalous and unreasonable results. B:-o""'tb~--l
subdivisions (a) and (b) of Hf'ction 465 providetbat the respt'clive agencies "shall place and maintabi~' the required-'trAffic control devices. If two 01' more agenciE's had tbe same
manrlatory duty, confusion would result when they sought to
discharge their duties over tbe same hi~hway, and the uniformity sought to be achieved by the state hi~hway system
'Would be defE'ated. (Set' Atlas JliZM Mortar Co. v.City of
RlIrbank, 202 Cal. 660. 663 r262 P. 3341.) Moreover, the
placement and maintenance of traffic signs and signals is only
a part of the general duty to maintain streets and highways
in a safr and usable condition. Whether 01' not there is need
for warning signs or signals will frequently rlepc>nd on what
otht'r step!1l may be taken to render the hi~hway safe and
llllAble. . In the present case, for instance, posting a warnin~
si~n would be only one of several means that might be adopted
t.o apprise motorists of the curve ahead. Proj)er maintenance
mh!ht eliminate the dan~er altogether, 110 that no warnin~
'\II'Ol11rl bE' nf'Cessary.
Tt would be unreasonable to eoncl1lCle
tbAt. the T.JeJrl!11lature intf'ndt'rl that the limitE'd part of maintenance involving the placement and maintcnance of traffic

/

660

GILLESPm tI. Om OF Los ANGElo1I:S

signs and signals should be treated differently from the prob;
lem as a whole.
~
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the city had both
authority and the duty to correct the allegedly dangero~,
condition under the terms of a contract between the eit)r;
and the Department of Public Works whereby the state agency :
delegated authority to the city. (See Sts. & By. Code, §§ 114,,'
116, 203.) The contract in question dealt with the allocatiQ..n-':
of gas tax funds and was a renewal of biennial agreement.$
between the city and the state containing substantially th .
same terms dating back to 1934. It provided in substance
that the city should perform general maintenance work on
all state highways within the city limits with the exception
of Route 156, here in question, and Route 205. General maintenance work on these routes was to be done by the state.
Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that fnilure to give propel';:
warning of the curve was the causE' of the accident, and that'
the city should have installed the necel!lsar'Y warning signs
or barricades between the curb line and right of way line of
the highway, on the ground that responsibility for mainte-I
nance of this area was delegated to the city under the terms.'
of a ,miscellaneous provision of the contract. That provis
. ~.'.
provIded:·.;
"The department will maintain the State highways ~lU
curb line to curb line only. There is hereby delegated to the
city the maintenance of the areas between curb lines a3d~
right of way lines, except when operations by the department
are being conducted thereon in connection with the construe·'
tion or maintenance work between the curb lines."
[6] The city contends, however, that this provision was not.
intended to apply to a mountain road lacking the usus'",
curbs and sidewalks of the ordinary city street. It contend..
also that in referring to maintenance of the area beyond thr .,'
curb line the parties had in mind such maintenance as DligJI1,•.,
be necessary to make the area itself safe for use, not such,
maintenance within that area as might be necessary to m8kt·~ :
the roadway safe and usable.
"~
It is clear when the contract is read in the light of tlll"'j
surrounding circumstances that the parties did not intend tn]
apply the quoted provisions to the short section of Route 15ft
that cuts across an outlying corner of the city's territory, Th.')
parties did not interpret their 81!i'ef'mf'nt as imposing upon thf' \
city any duty with respE'ct to fhl:' maintenance of Route I5nj
State engincprs testified thAt th!' state did all the maintenance',l
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work on the highway including the. placing of warning signs
alld safety devices. The" construction given the contract by
th~ acts and conduct of the partiE'S with knowledge of its
terms, ,before any controversy h~ arisen as to its meaning.
ill entitled to great W~lg.bt and will, when reasonable, be adopted
and ~nforced by the courts." (Woodb'Re v. VaR Hom, 29
CaJ.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 17).) The construction placed upon
the contract by the parties in the present case is not only
reasonable, but a contrary construction would be unreasonable.
Route 156 is a mountain road. lacking the sidewalk area whose
maintenance could reasonably b~ st'porated from that of the
roadway. Moreover, I~S!\ than ont' twentieth of the mountain
section of the highway lies WIthin the city limits, The only
access to this st>~tion is from the road itself on either end, and
the gent'ral character of thc hiJthway remains unchanged as
it passes into and then out of the city limits. It would be
unreasonable to coneludt' that the parties intended that the
state mnintain the whole of the highway up to the city limits,
then only tht' pavement for tht' next fraction of a mile, and
tht>n resume maintenance of the whol~. leaving to the city
tht' responsibility for maintoining the borders of the road
fOT the fraction of a mile in between ..
[6] Even if it isassu'med, however. that Under the terms
of its contract the city was responsible formaintaming the
aT~a beyond the traveled portion of the highway, its duty of
maintenance was defined and limited by the contract. The
maintenance clause provided:
.. Maintenance work shall be adequate to keep the roadway,
structures, and facilities in the safe and usable condition to
which they have been constructed or improved. and provision
shall be made for constantly making needed repairs to preserve a smooth surface.
"Maintenance work shall be satisfaetory to the department,
and should the department at any time consider the mainten8uce of the State highway rout(>R or any portion of the routes
um~lItisfactory and inadeqllate for the traffic needs and conditions If.hereon, and if tilt' city does not correct the unsatisfaetory eondition aftt'r due notice from the department, the
departm('nt may Clltf'T upon such State highway route and
maintain such street WIth its own forces, and the oost will be
defrayed from the % cent gas tax allocated for expenditure
upon Statt' highways within thp (,lty .,
Under this provision the city's duty of maintenance W88
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limited to keeping "the roadway, strueturea, anJ facilities iIi· j
the safe and usable condition to which they have been CODstructed or impNved." It was under no' duty and it lacked
authority to add additional structures and facilities. The,
department of public works rctained the authority under the',
contract to determine when maintenance beyond keeping the
highway in the condition to which it had been constructed or
improved was necessary to make the rout<'s satisfactory and .
adequate for the traffic nceds and conditions thereon. There ii :
no evidence that Boute 156 was not maintained in the.> condi.,j
tion to which it was constructed or improved at the time tho 1
city first undertook maintenance dutieS under its contract.' ,:'
Plaintiffs contend, on the contrary, that the curve was dan- .~
gerona and defective because additional warnings were not'
provided and that the city is responsible because, after having"
knowledge of the dangerous condition, it faU('d to provide .
them. Under its contract, however, it had no authority to do so. Since the judgment must be reversed no purpose wonld her':,
served by considering the appeal from the order denying'~
defendant's.
motion
vacate
the judgment.
AC.CO.rdingIY
.. , . .
the appeal from
the to
order
denying
the motion to
vacatl' tb('7
judgment is dismissed.
.
. l·
. The judgment is reversed. ....'. -. . --.--~.

J.:.>!!

,

.1;,

Shenk, J., Edmonds,' J., and Spence, J'J' concurred.

CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority hold: (1) That under the law the state ba.'1
the eulmivB right to maintain traffic warning devices along
state highways and therefore the city having no power to
maintain them cannot be held responsible for its failure to do .~
so, (2) That the city did not acquire such authority und('r its
contract with the state. I cannot agree with either proposi- :
tiOL.
,",
As to the 1irst proposition, there are two answers. 'wri, the .
statutes correctly construed, confer upon both the city and
the state the right to maintain traffic warning signs. The
majority rely upon provisions of the Streets and Highways:
Code, which state that the state shall have full "possession
and control" of all state highways within or without cities :;
and shall maintain them, which includes safl'ty devices. (Sts.j
& By. Code, §§ 27, 100, 204.) Those provisions do not Deees- ,
sarily mean that the state's authority is exclusive, and at
least, as to wami1lg devices, must be read in connection with _,

i
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the provisions of the Vehicle Oode. Rection 461;(&) of the
J.tt.er .'ode fir.tt Rtates that the state shf\ll rnllintain such
approprill.te signs as may be ueCeHRary toO warn traffic. Subdi,i.-lion (b) then reads: '! Local authorities in their respective
jurisdictions shall place and tnaintain or cause fo be placed and
nlaintained such traffic signs and, subject to the provisions of
&cction 466, such stop signs, semaphores and control devices
upon streets and highways as may be necessary to indicate
and to carry out the provisions of this code or local traffic
ordinances or to regulate, warn or guide traffic." (Emphasis
added.) The exception referred to (§ 466) deals only with
the> crection by a city of traffic control signals such as a stop
si~ or scmaphore. It will be noted that the authority of a
city extends to "streets and highways" within its boundaries.
" 'Street' or 'highway' is a way or place of whatever nature,
publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for
purposes of vehicular trave1." (Emphasis added.) (Veh.
Code, § 81.) Thus, where the two provisions are construed
tognther, (Sts. & By. Code, and Veh. Code, supra) that is,
the provisions for state and local maintenance of warning
devices, both the state and city are clearly given authority
-----..to-maintain such _~gns. Indeed the provisions of the Vehicle
Code are more approPfiaiely applicable, for they expressly
deal with traffic problems and the safety precautions inherent
therein, rather than general supervision over state highways.
Second, it is clear that the obligation and duty rested upon
the city to request the state to erect signs, or at least, to
authorize the city to do so. Baving failed to do so, it is liable.
That is the square holding in Shea v. Oity of San Bernardino,
7 Cal.2d 688 [62 P.2d 365]. There the dangerous condition
existed in a street where it crossed railroad tracks. Although
the }{ailroad Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over such
crossings, the court held the city liable on two distinct theories.
Onc, that the city should have p18ced a warning sign on its
street at the approach to the crossing, and on the other. it
stated: "In giving consideration to appellant's contention that
th(> city was powerles... to remedy the defect the above-ml'ntioned hypothesis will be as!'romed to be correct. Neverthcll'ss,
the cont.cntklD is not imprcllSive. It must be reDlembert~d
thnt. the improvement of streets within the bounoftries 1)£ a
city is an affair in which the city is vitally interested. The
governlllg board and officel'1'l of th(> municipality in dealing
with such an affair may not complacently declare tkat they
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powerless over a long period of flears to take a"fl riePl:~
to remedy a defective and dangerous condition that eziBted in·
one of the principal streets of the city. If the railroad C9m- ~:~
mission had the exclusive jurisdiction to order the north track. :
to be lowered it was the duty of the city at some time during ~.
the Biz.year period to call upon the railroad CDm,uisBion to
order the rail to be lowered and thus to remove' an obviously
dangerous condition in the street. " (Emphasis added.) (Shea
v. City of 8an Bernardino, supra, 692.) It follows therefore
that the city here is liable under the rule in the Shea caIIIe.On the second proposition it is clear that the contract by i
its express terms provides that the city has control over and the '
duty of maintaining the highway here involv~ insofar as the
untravelled portion is concerned. It states: "The (state)
will maintain the State highways from curb line to curb line
only. " The warning devices here involved would have been
outside the curb line. It is indeed a technical distinction to
say, as do the majority here, that that means the city need
only keep the area outside the curbs safe for such use as may
be made of that area alone without regard to uses which may be
made of the highway between the curbs. The warning signs
are necessarily within the area under the city'8 jurisdiction._
Therefore, sO are the placing of such warning signs. The "...ord
maintain as used therein means, as the majority assert in the
forepart of its opinion, the maintenance of safety devicea:The expression is from curb line to curb line, thus indicating
that the contract, includes highways whcre there is not in fact
a curb. From curb line to curb line means the travelled portion of the highway. (In re lve.., 155 App.Div. 670 [140
N.Y.S. 694].) If warning devices are required on the area
of the right of way outside the curbs for the purpose of warning
against some defect therein, it is not reasonable to suppose that .
the city would have exclusive control of such de'\ices, while
the state would have exclllsive jurisdiction over the same
area for persons staying on the travelled portion of the highway. It is obvious that the city would control said area for
the benefit of those using any portion of the highway. Indeed
the instant case is typicol. The absent warning device would
be n white fence along the edge of the right of way which
would serve as a sa£<.>ty factor for persons using the travelled
or untravclled portion of the highway. Th<.> testimony of
state highway engineers that thE'state did all the placing of
warning devices dot's not mean that the state bad thc exclusive right to do so. The respective duties and responsi-
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bilities of the state and cit)' must be aseertained by reading
the code provil!ions andeontract applicable thereto. It is
clear from these provisions that the duty rested upon the cit)'
to maintain the absent warning devices, and its liability for
"the accident here involved was, therefore, established.
This case was tritd before a mOl!t able and experienced trial
judge and a jury. Evidence that the accident was the result
of a dangerous and defective condition of the highway is
almost free from conflict.. The judgment in favor of plainti1fs
was affirmed by a unanimous decision of the District Court of
Appeal (95 A.C.A. 438 [213 P.2d 831). That decision contains
a clear and correct statement of the facts and the law applicable thereto. I adopt it as a part of this dissent. The opinion
of the District Court of Appeal prepared by Mr. Presiding
Justice Minor Moore and concurred in by Justices Emmet
Wilson and Marshall McComb is as follows:
" Appeals from six judgments on verdicts against appellant
for its negligence in failing to maintain a portion of a state
highway resulting in the deaths of six persons, and from the
order denying appellant's motion to set aside such judgments.
"In the far reaches of the sprawling city of Los Angeles
through the mountainous region that lies to the west of that
metropolis. a state highl'ay-Route 15S-lies along a eircui-.tous canyon road. While it extends in a generally westward
direction through Topanga Canyon.from Ventura Boulevardto the Pacific Ocean about 20 miles, only .86 of a mile thereof
lies within the city's corporate limits. Along this highway
an automobile with six occupants proceeded on the night of
September 4, 1943. At a curve in the road the vehicle did
not follow the pavement, but, instead, continued on a straight
course and plunged 150 feet into the canyon below. No one
that viewed. the tragedy survived to relate who was driving,
the rate of speed of travel or the direction in which the car
was headed. The only memento of the dire event was the
burned wreckage in the sullen depths below. From. the:
evidences of the manner in which the machine left the pav~
ment and tumbled into the gorge and from the applicable
presumptions, it was established that by reason of the city'8
negligence in failing to maintain warning devices and barriers along the right of way of Route 156 the decedent
motorists rushed to their deaths.
"The road was surfaced with asphaltic concrete pavement
,. • A principal state hi&hw&7
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varying in width from 20 to 24: feet with shoulders of roek
and oil or decomposed granite from 6 to 8 feet in width. A' :;
the scene of the al!Cidl'nt there were no barriers, posts, barri~
cades, blinkers, cats-eyes or other warning devices. Neither.;
"'8.'! there a zigr.ag line painted on tht' pawmf'nt nt the at>;,
ptonch to the curvc. A center stripe of broken white lines'
had been painted on the road approxinlatdy thrl'C monthS'
earlier. The average lifl' of b'Ueh a stripe is 14 or 15 DlOntha.'
The grade was approximately 5.5 ppr c('nt and the Cllr\'e hadll~
radius of approximately 150 feet with similar curves abov~_
and below thc point of accident. Standard signs such &8'
'Windintt Road' and 'Slow' to a designated safe specd had
been installed at points above and below the locus of the
accident. There was some evidence that the road was without
a dimout area proclaimed by the Westcrn Defense Comr.land.,_
H Actions by surviving r<.'latives against appt'llant, sometimes herein referred to as the city, and the State of California
were commenced on the theory that, the highway had beon
defectively designed and that the city and the state had ,
permitted dangerous and defective conditions to exist which-)
caused the accident. After the court at Sacramento held ':1
that the amended complaint did not state a cause of action'
~.against the state, the action was dismissed as to that defendant.
'f Thereupon, the cause was transferred to the court below in ';
which, after ,trial, verdicts aggregating $110,000 were entered "
" against the c i t y . '
"As grounds for reversal the city ('on tends :
,,
"(1) The boulevard involved is a state highway and under
the exclusive control of the state and therefore the city cannot
be liable for ,neglect of it.
• , (2) Since the danger complained of relates to the construction and design' of the highway, the agreement to maintain cannot be held to apply to the Topanga Canyon Road.
,I, (3) Not only was the highway not in a dangerous Of",
defective condition but it does not appear that the condition }1
of the highway was a proximate cause of the accident.
" (4) The trial having been commenced in Sacramento 1
j
County, its transfer to Los Angeles County for the purpose of !
resuming and finishing the proceeding was prejudicaJ error; \
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County had no jurisdic- i
tion to try the cases and enter judgments.
1
"Om LIABLE UNDER GENERAL L A w l
"The instant action was instituted under the 'Public Lia- !
bility Act' of 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 675; 2 Deering'8 Gen.
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Laws, Act 5619.) Section 2 provides ' •.. municipalities
. . . shall be liable for injuries . . . resulting from the dangerous or defective condition of public streets, highways . . .
in all ClUes where the governing or managing board of such
• . . municipality •.. htwing attthnrity to remedy such conditinn, had knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous
condition . . . and fail('d OT neglected • • . to remedy such
condition or failed and neglf'cted . . . to take such action
as may be reasonably necessary to protect the public. • • .'
(Emphasis added.)
"Under the act liability is imposed npon municipalities
for injuries to persons or property resulting from dangerous
or defective conditions of public streets and highways when
the city has notice of the defect and fails to remedy it.
(Watson v. Alameda, 219 Cal. 331, 333 [26 P.2d 286];
Arellano v. City of Burbank, 13 Cal.2d 248, 254 [89 P .2d 113] .)
The general rule is that liability exists not only for defects
arising after construction but also for improper construction
in the first instance. (George v. Los Angeles, 11 Cal.2d 303"
30S [79 P.2d 723] ; Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. tt S. F. Ry. Co., .
28 Col.App.2d 215, 219 [82 P.2d216].) In order to escape
liability the city must either eliminate the dangerous condition or protect the pu~lic by adequate warning, and the snffi-·
ciency of such warning is a question of fact in each case.
(Bigelow v. Ontario, 37 Cal.App.2d 198, 205 [99 P.2d 298];
Barsoom v. Reedly, 38 Cal..App.2d 413,419 [101 P.2d 743].)
"Thp jury by its verdict has impliedly found that a dangerous and defective condition existed, and that appellant had
notice thereof but failed to remedy it. Under the act there
remains only one other condition precedent to the imposition
of liability on the city. The case must be one in which
the municipality has 'authority to remedy such condition.'
Appellant argues that it did not exercise control over the highway here involved, and therefore is not liable under the act.
The act docs not require that a municipality exercise control
over a highway; rather, it imposes liability where the municipality has 'authority to remedy the condition' and fails
to do so. The language of the Act of 1923 is sufficient au- .
thority for thc city undcr the facts to remove the peril. The
authorities relied upon by appellant are not pertinent on
this point. They (Watson v. City of Alameda, 219 Cal. 331
[26 P.2d 286] ; Perry v. City of San Diego, 80 Cal.App.2d 166
[181 P.2d 98], and Sine·lair v. Oity of Pasadena, 21 Cal.App.
2d 720 L70 P.2d 241J) relate only to the question of the snffi-
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ciency of, th", notice to the cities involved ~t a danllrero1it1l
and defective, condition cxisted. In the instant case the
ciency of the ,notice is attested by thc prior aceidents at
: samc place. '(Bigelow v. Ontario, supra, 204 ; 8andstoe
l Atchison, T. " 8. 1'. By. Co:,2S Cal.App.2d 215, 219 [82
i 2d 216].) GaUano v. Pacific Gas " Electric Co., 20 ....- .••1'.."1
2d 534 {67 P.2d 388], is not applicable. It concerns
liability of an abutting property owner, and not that of
municipality.
"
" Appellant's contention that a municipality is not
for dangerouS and defective conditions over which it does
'exercise control is not supported. If the failure to exereise
control were sufficient to avoid liability the whole purport and
intent of the Public Liability Act of 1923 eould be obviated
simply by inertia. The cases eited by appellant are not in'
point because the applicable statutes specifically relieved the ,
nlUnicipalities of liability or because they were instituted
against parties other than municipalities. Notwithstanding the '
Act of 1923 and the authorities In.o;t cited. appellant conteifds "
that it •has no supervision or eontrol over route 156 within
its city limits.' In support of such contention it cites 'a number
of authorities which on elose inspection fall of their ...",..nn...
In 801£thern.c.f!!~to!!!~ Jlo.~, _Co, v. McGuire, 2
"
[39 P.2a412], a proceeding in mandamus, the city had by'
contract with' the state undertaken the construction and
'provement ofa state highway"within the corporate
After such contract had been executed the petitioner agreed
by a writing to do the work. This document fulfilled the,
requirements of the city charter but did not comply with state "
law. The court held that such a contract must conform with
state law. No question of tort liability was raised in the case.
Neither the proposition there enunciated nor the facts recited
can aid in the solution of the question at bar. Merely because
the state retains supervisorial powers over city subcontracts. ,
the city is not thereby relieved of obligations imposed upon it '
by general law. In the cited case the entire work was to be
done by the city. In the instant ease, all work was to be done '
by the state with the exception of that done from the curb
line to the property line. In the McGuire ease, supra, the city
took the position that it was required to comply with state law.
In the instant case, the city takes the position that the general"
laws of the state did not impose upon it any obligation to
erect barriers or warning devices in the area allocated to it
by the 'contract. These contentions arc not only inconsistent
,but the argument of the city finda no IUpport in. the l4cGuire
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ease. In 8ta(lelmmtll v. Ctty of Nc'll) )/l)rk, 126 A!1p:Div. 852
{llO N.Y.S. 682], the court held the city not liablt for injuries
sustained by a pedestrian. There is no sbowinp: that the road
there involved was a state highway. The case sbeds no light
upon the instant issues. The same is true of Trotter v. Town
of Glenmora, (La.App.) 2 So.2d 510, which follows the Stadelmann decision.
"THE Om Is LaBLE UNDER 'l'BE CoNTRACT
"For the purpose of improving an~ maintaininll certain
state highways, the state determlntd abollt August, '943, to
effect certain projects. In that month the city and the state
entered into a written agreement pertaining to the maintenance of certain state highways within the city, including
Route 156. In compliance with section 203 of the Streets and
Highways Code, the agreement provided for the expenditure
of $7,250 by the Department of Public Works.- 'The portions
of state highway routes to he maintained under pro.lffl 97(b)
are described as follows: "Route 156. TOpanft8 Canyon Road,
from city limits ahout 2.70 miles north of junction with Route
60 to north city limits near Fernwood Park: a lenlrth of approximately 0.86 mile for this portion. t·, Tht' Department
of Public Works did not delegate authority or jurisdiction
over Route 156 in iul entirety to the city. The onlY8pecific
reference to that highway comes under the. heading: '(b) Work
by the department. '
" •Article VI, Miscellipleous Provisions' of the agreement
provides: 'In the event the work of maintaining theatate
highway routes within the city is being done by the department, the approval of the department shall be secured before
any encroachment on the surface or any cut, excavations or
openings in the vehicular roadway 8Te permitted The department un7.l maintain the State high'll/Quit from cvrb line
"-The fund expended on the eonstruction lind mRintenanre of highwa".
is dmpated 'Motor Vehicle Fuel Fund.' It 11 railed 1»1 leviea
of 6 centa per gallon on an gaaoline fuel distribnted in the state. (Rev.

n

" Tax. Code,
7351, 8651.) The ltate treasurer pays it into the State
Highway Fund. (Ibid., tt 8357, 9302.) Snch fund must .be expended
for the maintenance of state highwa,... (Sta. .t By. Code, .188.) The
Deparbnent of Public Work! shaD expend sn amount not lese than the
revenue derived from one-fourth eent per gallon tax on SUM fuel fOT the
improvement and maintenance of ltate highways within cities. (Ibid.,
.203.) A municipality ma" contract with thf' statl! for the performance
of the work within its ooTporate limite, (ibid., .202) and in reapcet to
the proportion of the expenses of such improvement and. maintenance of
a highway to be borne by the reapaetive Pflrties. Rnd such highway may
be located in whole or in part within the limits of the oontraetiDa aty.
(Ibid., t 180.)
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'mt»nttmance
0 curb _ O'nZy.
There" hereby 4ezegated to the city ,hi'
of the areas between curo UM. aM right of
,

"

tOG; ,

liM' .••J " ; :
"Appellant advances the proposition that it is ·not liable'
for a dangerous condition of property over which it docs not
exercise control. If by any chance the city is not liable under '
the Public Liability Act and the decisions heretofore cited,:,
it is liable beyond a peradventure by virtue of its agreement <
for detriment caused by its neglect to maintain its streets ina
reasonably safe condition. Under its' contract with the state":
the liability of appellant is accentu",ted. In support of ita, '.~
thesis, the city cites Griffith v. Towffof Berlin, 130 Conn. 84 :
[32 A.2d 561 ; Gardner v. City of CovingtO'n, 86lnd.App; 229 "
[156 N.E. 8301; Brunacci v. PZaw Tovmship, 315 Pa. 391 :
[173 A. 3291; Barnett v. City of OpeZoUlGl, (La.App.) 18 :
So.2d 188; GZower v. Toum of PO'nclUJtouZa, (La.App.) 17:
So.2d 44; Gabbert v. City of Brownwood, (Tex.Civ.App.r:
176S.W.2d 344. In no respect do these authoritietapply. ':
In none of them was there an agreement between the city ,
and the Department of Public Works obligating' the munici~ ,
pality to maintain a part of the highway in question.
;:.
"While •full control and possession of aU state highwap is
. -vested in-the-StateDepartJD.eiit-of P,ibliiWor'ks'" (sti.& By.'
Code, § 100) yet the Department of State Highways may::
delegate to any ,city· the -department 'spowers,' duties 'an .:
authority as to any state highway or any part thereof. (Ibid, ,"
§ 676; 80uthern CaZilorma Boadl Co. v. McGuire, 2 Cal.2d :'
115, 123 [39 P.2d 412].)
' .
"Appellant contends that the italicized portions of its
contract pertain to the maintenance of sidewalks and parking 1
strips along those streets which are improved ~d that they I
can have no reference to a mountain road such as that in
Topanga Canyon 'where the only portion of the right of
way improved for travel aIid so used is the roadway designed
and maintained by the State for vehicular travel.' But the,'
unambiguous language of the contract clearly gives to the
city the right and obligation to maintain those portions of
the highway, extending outward from the curb line to the
right of way lines and by its contract the city was in that
area obligated to do whatever was essential to make the high.
way reasonably safe for travel at all times. That the trial
court adopted such thesis is evidenced by' the fact that it
instructed the jury that the pleadings admitted that by the
agreement the city was authorized to maintain the areas!
>
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between curb lines and right of way lines. This instruction
was correct since appellant had attached a copy of the agreement to its answer as a part thereof. Having admitted the
execution and validity of its own contract appellant is in
no position to deny the significance of its plain provisions.
"Thus by contract not only did the city acquire the right
to erect warning signs and barriers upon those portions of
the highway outside the paved road but thereby its duties
undcr the Public Liability Act were enlarged. There is no
rrasonable basis for appellant's contention that it lacked
power to do the acts esscntial to the maintenance of the .86
mile on Route 156 as a safe highway. The fund under
control of the Highway Commission was available in sufficient
amount to make it safe. By the contract the city was required to 'maintain the highway from curb line to the right
of way line.' And even though the language of the contract
did not require the city to perform any work upon th~ paved
portion, a reasonable construction would require appellant
either to paint zigzag white stripes on the pavement at approaches to curves or to keep barriers outside the pavement
wherever a dangerous condition existed so near the pavement
as to be a peril, or to post warning signs. Having failed to
do those things) even assuming appellant's contention that
it lacked power or authorization to do so, it was nevertheless
not relieved of the responsibility to warn persons lawfully
using the highway that a dangerous condition existed. (8h.etl
v. City of 8t1n Bernardino, 7 Cal.2d 688, 693 [62 P.2d 365];
Rose v. County of Orange, 94 Cal.App.2d 688, 691 [211 P.2d
45].) A municipality may not ignore a hazard to travelers
within its borders on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction
to act. (8h.ea v. City of 8an BerMrdino, supra, 692, 693.)
There was no evidence adduced at the trial that the city
had urged the department to remedy the condition at the
place of accident. Having failed to take action itself under
a contract which empowered it to act, and having failed to
urge action on the part of the department which appellant
contends had the sole power to act, the city cannot now assert
that it was not delinquent in its duty to the public.
, 'MAINTENANCE

"It is next argued that the posting of adequate warning
signs and erection of guards and barriers is not a matter
of maintenance, but of construction and therefore the agreeIllent did not require the city to erect such devices. The
answer to this contention is found in section 27 of the Streeti

